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Although in these days of increasing education, accesses to the internet, and 
apparent inability of scientist to produce correct information with regard to 
BSE it is probably not possible to state that the public has unquestionable 
believe in experts, however, it is reasonable to assume that experts still have 
some credibility left. It is the feeling of the present author that what the 
public want of experts is unambiguous factual information. People expect their 
doctor to tell them what is wrong with them and to give them something to make 
them better, scientists are expected to come up with clear answers to questions 
such as is the MMR vaccine is safe, is it safe to eat beef, and whether junk 
food is bad for your health. The way science is portrayed in the media is mainly 
in a very factual way: programmes are shown where it is stated that dinosaurs 
became extinct after a meteor collided with the earth, that the Universe began 
in a "big bang" and that life on earth gradually evolved. The public on the 
whole do not usually question these assertions, possibly because they do not 
have the detailed evidence for and against, or the scientific skills to assess 
the evidence, making it very difficult to produce a case against the ideas being 
put forward.  
 
It also seems a reasonable assumption that the status of the expert providing 
the facts will affect both the extent to which these facts are accepted as true 
and the willingness of others to question them. In the NHS it is the medical 
consultants who have the most status in clinical matters. Although it is not 
always the case, they are often in the position of being able to make statements 
that are not questioned and so become "true". If a psychiatrist give someone a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia then they are schizophrenic. This is what could be 
termed the doctrine of medical infallibility.  
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Clinical psychologists may now be seen as experts both by the general public, 
(with clinical psychologists frequently being asked for opinions by the mass 
media), and by professional colleges in other disciplines, a status we have 
attempted to enhance by taking on the titles of Doctor and Consultant. If the 
author’s case load is typical, we are constantly being asked for clear factual 
information e.g. does this client have a learning disability, is the client 
autistic, does this client have pre-senile dementia. This makes it tempting to 
answer these questions in an clear unambiguous way, which raises the seductive 
possibility that we too may be able to make use of our status to make infallible 
statements. One could state ones opinions under the guise of presenting facts 
without fear of being contradicted or questioned.  The more unusual the opinions 
the more it will demonstrate to others what a deep insight we have into people's 
psyches. However, in order to do this, one will have to state facts 
unambiguously and not suggest hypotheses.  
 
It seems to the present author that there are very few facts in either academic 
or clinical psychology.  The body of knowledge within psychology in a large part 
consists of observations and experimental findings, which are subject to error, 
with results that often can be interpreted in several different ways and that 
covers only a limited range of conditions.  To take an example from the authors 
clinical work in learning disabilities. There have been a number of tightly 
controlled experiments which demonstrate that challenging behaviour is 
maintained by the immediate consequences of the behaviour (Carr, Newsom and 
Binkoff 1980; Emerson et al 1996; Iwata et al 1982; 1994). The clinical 
implication of this being that the treatment of challenging behaviour in people 
with learning disabilities should concentrate on finding out what these 
consequences are via a functional analysis and then use behavioural methods to 
treat them. Again there are abundant studies demonstrating that such 
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interventions can be effective (see Scotti et al 1991; Whitaker 1993; 2000 for 
reviews). It therefore seems reasonable for a clinical psychologist to state in 
a meeting or write in a report that challenging behaviours are maintained by 
their consequences and that the appropriate treatment is to alter these 
consequences.  However, closer examination of this literature (Whitaker 1993; 
1996; 2000) reveals a number of problems with these studies. First, the bulk of 
the studies were done on very high frequency challenging behaviours (more 
frequent than one an hour), however, the majority of people who show challenging 
behaviour do so at much lower frequencies (Harris 1993; Kessler et al 1984). 
Secondly the vast majority of the studies used single subject designs, which, 
although they showed a clear effect for the client in the study, did not 
demonstrate that these results would be found in other clients. Thirdly, the 
studies, on the whole, were done in controlled settings in which there were 
staff available to do the functional analysis and run the subsequent programme. 
Therefore, although a functional analysis followed by a behavioural intervention 
may be effective for some clients, it is not possible to state that it will be 
effective with a particular client. Nor is it possible to say that other 
interventions, such as cognitively based methods, are going to be effective, as 
the evidence for these is even less convincing (c.f. Whitaker 2001).   
 
Similar problems occur even in the most routine tasks we undertake. For example, 
the WAIS III is subject to error even when given under ideal conditions, the 95% 
confidence range being about 4 to 7 points either side of the obtained IQ score. 
These errors may be even greater if the situations under which the assessment 
was administered was not ideal allowing a number of souses of error to effect 
the score, such distractions, tiredness, mental illness.   
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It therefore seems that, at least for psychology, it is very difficult to make 
definitive statements with regard to why a client has the problems they present 
or to the most effective treatment of their condition. Therefore it is very 
difficult to take on the role of both the expert, as in one who provides 
unequivocal facts. If we are to take on the role of the infallible expert not 
only will it require it a certain degree of bluff about the factual information 
we have but also there is a danger that we will start to believe what we are 
saying to others. Clients could therefore be wrongly labelled as having 
particular conditions such as a learning disability, dyspraxsia or an autistic 
spectrum disorder, which could be written in their records and possibly stay 
with them for life. Inappropriate treatment programmes may be set up and 
continued in spite of evidence that they are not working (c.f. Woods and Cullen 
1983).  There is also likely to be an effect on how any staff working with the 
psychologist come to perceive clients and why they have the problems they have, 
which could perpetuate the ideas put forward by the infallible psychologist.  
One must also consider what would happen if it was eventually demonstrated by 
some mischievous scientist that what the psychologist had been saying was not 
altogether true.  
 
If we take on the role of the scientist it may not give us the same boost to our 
self-esteem as playing the expert in the short term but it will probably be 
better for clients and the profession in the long term. Working clinically as an 
applied scientist should mean that we generate, and if possible test, hypotheses 
as to why a client has the problems they have. Treatment should then be based on 
what seems to be the most likely “working” hypothesis. As a hypothesis is only 
one of several possible explanations for what we can observe, it is clear, both 
to others and ourselves, that it could be wrong so there is no danger of a 
psychologist being shown to have been over stating their case. If a formulation 
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of a client’s problems and proposed treatment plans are presented in terms of 
hypothesis it will mean that we continually check whether the evidence still 
supports the hypothesis and whether the treatment is working. This should mean 
that formulations are changed and treatment plans revised more often than they 
would be if the formulation were based on an unambiguous statement, which would 
lead to more effective treatment. Hopefully other professions will see how we 
approach cases and look at their own practice and start to question some of 
their own assumptions and start to consider things in terms of hypothesis. It 
also should lead to better targeted research, as to generate appropriate 
hypothesis we will need to be aware of the appropriate psychological research 
and the limitations of this research.  
 
It seems to the present author that if we are to take on the role of the 
infallible expert then we will have to sacrifice our scientific integrity which, 
ultimately will do more harm than good to the profession and, more importantly, 
to those whom we treat.  What we should do is to admit that there is a lot that 
we don’t know and constantly question what we do. Ultimately this should lead to 
more knowledge and consequently better treatment for our clients.  
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